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The African Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) provides preferential access to Africa's products 
in US markets. While proponents expect that AGOA will expand Africa's exports to the US, 
opponents argue that such increases are unlikely, particularly regarding agricultural exports. This 
paper offers new empirical evidence that is inconclusive regarding the impact of AGOA on 
African exports to the US.  
 




The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which was signed into United States (US) 
law in May 2000, offers preferential access to Sub-Saharan Africa's (SSA) products in US 
markets. In return, beneficiary countries must commit to improve their economic policy 
environment, participate more actively in the globalization process, promote political and 
economic stability, and foster human and workers' rights in Africa (Mattoo, Roy and 
Subramanian, 2002). The idea of creating a new form of trade preferences exclusively for SSA, 
in addition to already existing Generalized Systems of Preferences (GSP), drew both support and 
opposition from a wide range of actors. Pointing to the marginal place of SSA in the global 
markets for goods, services and investments, supporters have argued that AGOA would expand 
African exports to US, increase foreign direct investment, and create new employment 
opportunities in SSA.   
AGOA also faced severe criticisms, especially from international anti-globalization 
movements and US interest groups. In the US, textile lobby groups and labor unions were 
primarily concerned that removal of trade barriers on textile and apparels would result in massive 
loss of jobs (Cooper, 2002; Friedman, 2000a; 2000b). Recently, US fruit growers urged the 
administration to re-impose a 15.3% import duty on canned pears, claiming that AGOA gave 
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South African pear farmers an unfair advantage over US farmers (Poole, 2002). Opponents have 
also charged that AGOA benefits will remain essentially illusory for most countries in SSA 
(Blackman and Mutume, 1998; Mutume, 1998; Raghavan, 2000). Though largely 
unsubstantiated, several limitations of the current SSA-US trade relationship implicitly support 
the latter criticism, at least in the short run. First, not only are the SSA's exports to US dominated 
by petroleum products, but they are also highly concentrated in a few countries. Second, US 
trade policies, along with trade policies in other OECD countries, generally give a mixed signal 
to trading partners (Linsey, 2002). In particular, agricultural subsidies and tariff and non-tariff 
barriers in OECD countries contribute most of the price distortions in the world agricultural 
markets (Nouve et al., 2002).   
   Even with these limitations, preferential trade opportunities would generally tend to have 
a positive effect on total exports from developing countries (Cheng and Wall, 1999; Rose, 2002; 
IMF and The World Bank, 2001; 2002). However, their impacts on agricultural exports are less 
clear, primarily due to high distortions in the world's agricultural trading system. For example, 
SSA's share in the European agricultural markets has declined despite nearly three decades of 
trade preferences extended to SSA under several ACP-EC agreements
1 (Mattoo, Roy and 
Subramanian, 2002; Rose, 2002). Yet, almost every development strategy in SSA recognizes the 
central role of agriculture in stimulating an export-led growth. This raises an important question: 
How have SSA's agricultural exports to US responded to the trade opportunities offered under 
AGOA? The very few studies that have evaluated the AGOA initiative, such as Mattoo, Roy and 
Subramanian (2002), have not addressed this specific question. This study, therefore, attempts to 
                                                 
1 One may also argue that the decline could have been even worse without these preferences. There is no evidence 
that the declining share of SSA’s exports to EU is due to trade “distortions” as opposed to lack of productivity 
growth in African agriculture, especially compared to agriculture in Asia, which has made African exports less 
competitive in world markets.   
  2 
fill the gap, using panel data regression techniques to isolate the ceteris paribus effects of AGOA 
on SSA's agricultural exports.   
   The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a synopsis on AGOA for 
readers who are not familiar with the legislation. The synopsis outlines the conditions for 
eligibility and discusses some key features of the potential benefits of AGOA. Section III 
presents the theoretical model based on the gravity trade equation, and Section IV discusses the 
empirical model and highlights important characteristics of the data. Results are presented and 
discussed in Section V. The last section concludes that AGOA may have contributed to expand 
agricultural exports from Africa to the United States, albeit, only marginally.  
 
2. A Synopsis of AGOA
2 and the US-SSA Trade 
The African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) is a US law that was signed in May 2000, 
and renewed in August 2002 under the AGOA II legislation. AGOA offers preferential access to 
Sub-Saharan Africa’s products into US markets, given that a set of conditions is satisfied. These 
conditions include overall improvement of the economic policy environment and respect of 
human and workers’ rights in AGOA beneficiary countries
3. Countries must commit themselves 
to (or make continual progress towards) establishing institutional environments that are 
conducive to the US-Africa trade.  
The US President determines what countries are eligible for AGOA benefits. A country 
can be AGOA-eligible only if it is eligible for the General System of Preferences (GSP). 
                                                 
2 Details information is available online at www.agoa.gov. Only some key features of the agreement are highlighted 
in this section.  
3 The detail set of conditions include: (i) commitment to a market-based economy; (ii) practice of rule of law and 
political pluralism; (iii) elimination of barriers to U.S. trade and investment; (iv) protection of intellectual property; 
(v) making efforts to combat corruption; (vi) adopting policies to reduce poverty, increasing availability of health 
care and educational opportunities; (vii) protection of human rights and workers’ rights; (viii) and elimination of 
certain forms of child labor. Although it is not expected that beneficiary countries will fully satisfy all these 
conditionalities, eligible countries must be committed to, and continue to make progress in regards to these reforms.  
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However, GSP eligibility does not necessarily imply AGOA eligibility. In December 2002, there 
were 38 countries that were declared AGOA eligible, though 45 of the 48 Sub-Saharan African 
countries were GSP eligible by that date. Thus, currently there are 10 SSA countries that are not 
AGOA eligible
4.  
AGOA benefits are multiple. In essence, the GSP gives African exporters a 5% 
preference margin over the average Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariff rate (Mattoo, Roy and 
Subramanian, 2002). These authors also suggest that GSP covered about 17% of African exports, 
which could increase to 72% as a result of AGOA.  
Under the initial AGOA legislation, beneficiary African countries were granted duty-free 
access for more than 1,800 tariff line products. This was in addition to the standard GSP list of 
approximately 4,600 products available to other GSP beneficiary countries outside Africa. 
However, these additional GSP eligible products excluded items such as footwear, luggage, 
handbags, watches, and flatware. In general, AGOA II expanded preferential access 
opportunities for SSA exports to US. But access to these opportunities requires an official 
determination by the US Trade Representative and the US International Trade Commission that 
the product is not import-sensitive when it is of African origin
5.  
AGOA offers two additional advantages in regards to GSP provisions. First, while the 
GSP provisions are scheduled to expire in 2006 for other beneficiary countries, AGOA-eligible 
countries are granted a 2-year extension of these provisions (until September 2008). Second, 
GSP benefits are capped in other beneficiary countries outside SSA, but are not subject to ceiling 
                                                 
4 The seven GSP-eligible countries that are not AGOA eligible include: Angola, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Equatorial 
Guinea, Liberia, Togo, and Zimbabwe. In addition, Comoros, Sudan and Somalia are not GSP eligible, and thus are 
also AGOA ineligible.  
5 Import-sensitive products are generally those that benefit from US domestic protection policies. There is a 
justifiable fear on the part of US stakeholders that giving unfettered access to these protected markets would 
undermine the expected political and economic benefits of the protection policies.  
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in AGOA beneficiary countries. Generally, a cap indicates the maximum volume of a given 
product (from a specific country or region) that is allowed to enter US markets under preferential 
terms. Out-of quota tariffs apply once the cap is filled.
6 
A special rule applies to textile and apparel. The rules provides for a duty-free and a 
quota-free access to SSA’s textile products made from US fabrics, yarns and threads, following 
what has been called the “triple transformation rule” (see, for example, Gibbon, 2002). 
Beneficiary countries may also source intermediary materials within eligible African countries. 
But exports that are based on regional materials should not, under AGOA II (which doubled the 
initial figures), exceed 3% of the total apparel imports into the US. This cap will increase up to 
7% of the overall US apparel imports over a period of 8 years. In addition, the lesser developed 
beneficiary countries
7 are eligible for the Special Rule, which authorizes them to source 
materials from all over the world until September 2004. Imports based on these materials may 
benefit from the duty-free treatment, although they are subject to the cap imposed on imports 
based on non-US materials. Note however that, countries can benefit from the apparel 
preferential treatment only after establishing an effective visa system that can detect illegal 
transshipments and counterfeits and enforce verification procedures.  
The specific, or even restrictive, rules of origin imposed on AGOA apparel imports are 
often one of the main sources of criticism of the initiative. Critics often argue that AGOA only 
permits apparels manufactured using US fabrics, yarns and threads. This criticism is not entirely 
correct, as there are cases (besides the special rule provisions) where African countries have the 
                                                 
6 For example, in the case of textiles and apparel, AGOA specifies only one cap for the whole Sub-Saharan African 
region. The apparel cap is measured in square meter equivalents, not in monetary term. This cap is filled on the “first 
come, first served” basis. 
7 The lesser developed beneficiary countries (LDBC) are defined as countries with a per capita income less than 
$1,500 in 1998. AGOA II granted LDBC status to Namibia and Botswana. By the end of 2002, there were 33 
countries that were beneficiaries of the Special Rule provisions.  
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opportunity to export non-US based apparels to the US (for details, see www.agoa.gov). There 
is, nevertheless, little doubt that these restrictive rules of origin reduce the scope of the AGOA 
preferential initiatives. For instance, Mattoo, Roy and Subramanian (2002) review the apparel 
provisions of AGOA and conclude that over the medium term, the initiative will expand Africa’s 
possibility to export its products to the US by US$100 to $140 million, corresponding to an 8% 
to 11% increase in African non-oil exports. Nonetheless, they also contend that the benefits 
would have been nearly five times greater, about US$540 million, were the terms of the 
preferential market access free of restrictive rules, in particular the rule of origin. One may be 
interested in knowing how much the contribution is, if any, of agricultural exports to the 
increases in non-oil exports. This is the central objective of this paper and we will devote the 
next section to laying out the theoretical framework used to address this question. 
 
3. The Gravity Trade Model 
This paper uses a gravity trade model to characterize the marginal impact of AGOA on African 
agricultural exports to US. The analysis is restricted to one-way bilateral trade from African 
countries to US, which is enough to answer the question regarding whether AGOA has increased 
agricultural exports from SSA to the US.  
The gravity trade model was developed in the 1960s. It has been used in pioneering 
works by Tinbergen (1962) and Pöynöhen (1963). The model, which is widely known for its 
empirical robustness
8, is based on a simple and intuitive rationale. It postulates that the volume 
of trade between two countries is proportional to their economic sizes (capacity to supply exports 
and to absorb imports) and inversely proportional to costs of trading. The distance between the 
two trading units has traditionally served as a proxy for trading costs (Lairds and Yeats, 1990).  
                                                 
8 The empirical robustness is often taken, according to Wang (1999), to mean high R-squared.  
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Besides their empirical robustness, gravity trade models also have strong theoretical 
foundations both in traditional and in the new trade theories (Wall, 1999; Cheng and Wall, 1999; 
Rose 2002; Evenett and Keller, 2002). The lack of rigorous theoretical underpinning has 
traditionally been the major criticism against gravity trade models. However, Wall (1999) 
indicates that such criticism has been weakened since Deardorff (1998) established a consistency 
between gravity models and variants of traditional trade theories, such as the Ricardian and 
Heckschser-Ohlin models. Wall (1999) also points to “earlier works by Anderson (1979) and 
Bergstrand (1985) who derived gravity equations from trade models with product differentiation 
and increasing returns to scale” (Wall, 1999; p. 35), suggesting that gravity models may also be 
consistent with the new trade theory pioneered by, among others, Paul Krugman, Elhanan 
Helpman and Gene Grossman.   
Although theoretical foundations have been established, the empirical application of the 
gravity model may lead to weak results in the presence of heterogeneities. Cheng and Wall 
(1999) show that with such heterogeneities, gravity models tend to underestimate the regression 
coefficients between high-volume traders, while overestimating them between low-volume 
traders. The SSA-US trade relationship is a potential candidate of these heterogeneity biases, as 
the composition, volume, as well as unobservable institutional or geopolitical components of 
these exchanges vary widely from one African country to the other. One way to control for 
countries’ heterogeneity is to impose a fixed-effects structure on the unobserved country-specific 
effects (Wall, 1999). Thus, the methodological framework used in this study is based on a 
modified version of what Cheng and Wall (1999) called a fixed-effects gravity trade equation. 
The modification is an augmentation that incorporates several characteristics of the AGOA 
legislation. The model can be represented as follows:  
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Xit = α0 + αt + αi + βitZit + γ itWit + εit,   i = 1, 2, …, N and t = 1, 2, …, T.  (1)  
 
where Xit represents agricultural exports from SSA country i to the US in period t. There 
are three intercept terms: (i) α0 is common to all countries and all periods; (ii) αt is common to 
all countries, but specific to each period; and (iii) αi, which captures countries’ heterogeneity, is 
common to all periods, but specific to each country. Zit is a vector of conventional gravity model 
variables such as income, population, and distance. Wit is a vector of dichotomous variables 
accounting for different features of AGOA (eligibility and apparel visa). Finally, εit represents 
the idiosyncratic errors that are assumed, as discussed in Wooldridge (2002, Chapter 10), to be 
serially uncorrelated with zero mean and constant variance across time.   
 
4. Empirical Method and Data 
Variables and Data Source 
The empirical model is directly based on Equation (1), which is estimated both in level and 
logarithms. The dependent variable Xit is denoted as AGXit, representing to quarterly agricultural 
exports from SSA country i to the US in period t.  The data on the one-way SSA-US bilateral 
trade is from the US International Trade Commission (USITC) database. The total exports from 
SSA to US (or equivalently the US imports for consumption from SSA) are disaggregated into 
agricultural (AGXit) and non-agricultural exports
9. 
                                                 
9 It is not clear whether the agricultural exports, as presented in the USITC database, included textile products. This 
is because the USITC presented the data as agricultural and non-agricultural exports, with no further details on the 
components of these categories. Preliminary checks, however, suggest that textile products (mainly from Section XI, 
Chapter 50-63, of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the US) are unlikely to be included in the agricultural exports. 
Nevertheless, it will be useful if the USITC provides details on the commodities included in the computation of the 
agricultural exports. For the purpose of this study, AGOA has some clear benefits for the textile sector in SSA, and 
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The vector Zit is formed by four standard gravity variables: gross domestic product in 
SSA country i (GDPit), in the United States (GDPjt), population in SSA country i (Nit) and US 
population (Njt). The US GDP data  were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the 
US Department of Commerce (USDOC-BEA, 2003) while the GDP values for SSA were 
obtained from the World Economic Outlook (WEO) database (September 2002) of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2002). While US GDP is available on a quarterly basis, it 
was necessary to “quarterize” the SSA data. For this purpose, we assume a uniform distribution 
of production across the year, which makes the quarterly figures one-fourth of the annual data. 
The population data were obtained from FAOSTAT, statistical database of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of United Nations (FAO, 2003). The quarterly observations are 
obtained by assuming that the population grows continuously and that observed data points 
correspond to the fourth quarter in each year. The last three quarters in a given year are filled by 
adding incrementally, one-fourth of the population increase between that year and the previous 
year
10.  
The distance between SSA countries and US is another standard variable in gravity 
equations, but it is irrelevant in our model, which is based on a fixed effects treatment of the 
unobserved effects. Fixed effects treatment calls for time-demeaning of the data and this will 
drop all time-invariant variables out of the gravity equation, including the unobserved effects αi 
(Equation (1)).  
                                                                                                                                                             
these are not considered in the dependent variable of the model, assuming that textiles are excluded from the USITC 
definition of the US agricultural imports.  What this means is that AGOA may have a stronger impact on agriculture 
in sub-Saharan Africa than is captured just in figures on agricultural exports, as the export of manufactured products, 
such as textiles, produced using agricultural products will boost the local demand for these agricultural products. 
10 For example, if a and b correspond to the annual populations in 1998 and 1999, respectively, a corresponds to 
1998:4 and b to 1999:4. Let c = (b - a)/4, the population in the first quarter of 1999 (1999:1) is (a + c); in the second 
and third quarters, the populations are (a + 2c) and (a + 3c), respectively; the fourth quarter’s population is (a + 4c), 
which is simply b. 
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 The  vector  Wit has three dummy variables:  AGOAit, which captures whether and when a 
given country was declared AGOA-eligible; VISAit, which indicates whether and when the 
eligible country has a visa system for apparel exports; and Q1, which is a dummy for the first 
quarter in each year. This quarter dummy was included because of the observation that SSA’s 
agricultural exports to US were much higher in the first quarter, as compared to the remaining 
three quarters (see Figure 1). These dummies take a value equal to one if eligibility or 
qualification for the visa system is granted before the middle of a given quarter. Otherwise, they 
are assigned a zero value. They are constructed based on public information available with the 
USITC. While the marginal effect of AGOA dummy is hypothesized to be positive, this of 
apparel visa’s dummy is ambiguous due to the imprecision in the definition of US agricultural 
imports in the USITC database
11. Finally, the intercepts αt were constructed on a yearly basis, 
instead of being quarterly dummies. This approach is adopted in order to save on the degrees of 
freedom. Thus, we have four country-invariant time dummies, d99, d00, d01 and d02 
corresponding, respectively, to the four years from 1999 to 2002.  
Key Features of the Data 
The share of agriculture in total exports from SSA to the United States varies widely 
from 0% for relatively large oil exporters, such as Angola and Gabon, to more than 95% in 
countries such as Liberia (Table 1). On average, agricultural exports form a very small fraction 
of SSA’s total exports to US (about 5% between 1998 and 2000 and one percentage point lower 
over the period 2001-2002). Agricultural exports in relatively high performing economies, 
including South Africa and Mauritius, form less than 5% of the total exports to the United States 
                                                 
11 In essence, it is not sure whether textiles are included in the agricultural import figures. The marginal effect of the 
apparel visa dummy will most likely be positive if textiles were included. However, if textiles are excluded from 
these imports, surge in textile exports from SSA to the US can lead to reallocation of resources away from 
agricultural exports, leading to their possible decline. Thus, the sign on apparel visa’s dummy is ambiguous (for 
further discussions, see Footnote 9.    
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(See Table 1 for details). Despite the small share of agriculture in the South African total exports, 
the country remains the second largest exporter of agricultural products from SSA to US, after 
Côte d’Ivoire, which accounts for at least one-third of these exports. Other major agricultural 
exporters include Malawi, Ghana, Kenya, and particularly Madagascar, which has increased its 
agricultural market share from about 4% in 1998-2000 to 11% in 2001 and nearly 19% over the 
first three quarters of 2002 (Table 2). More than three-quarters of Côte d’Ivoire’s exports to US 
were made of agricultural products during the period 1998-2000. This figure decreased to about 
half over the subsequent two years, and this decline may be partly due to the armed conflict that 
erupted in late 2002 in that country.  
Regarding non-agricultural exports, more than 85% of them are concentrated in four 
countries, namely Nigeria, South Africa, Angola and Gabon. Except South Africa, which 
presents high export diversification, the remaining three major non-agricultural exporters are oil-
rich countries (Table 3).  
The dominance of petroleum products in total African exports to the United States 
deserves further attention. Data from Mattoo, Roy and Subramanian suggest that the US’s share 
of SSA’s total exports is much larger (about 23%) than its share of non-oil exports, estimated to 
be about 7.4%. Even if petroleum products formed a large share of the increase in commodity 
coverage under AGOA II, they were subject to very low pre-AGOA average tariffs (about 1.5%). 
This prompts Mattoo, Roy and Subramanian to suggest that the removal of these tariffs would 
increase prices by about 1%, which will not yield significant benefits for major oil exporters, 
including Nigeria, Angola and Gabon. However, an official report on AGOA (US Department of 
Commerce, 2002) indicates that the legislation permitted $8.2 billion duty-free imports from 
SSA, including AGOA preferences. The report, however, recognizes a concentration at more 
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than 92% of these benefits in three countries (Nigeria, South Africa and Gabon), with Nigeria 
alone receiving $5.7 billion (about 70%).  
In their study, Mattoo, Roy and Subramanian also indicate that AGOA’s benefits are 
likely to come from two groups of non-oil exports: apparels and non-apparels such as footwear 
and agricultural products. Some non-apparel exports are subject to tariff rate quotas with high 
out-of quotas tariff rates as high as 350% on tobacco, 164% on peanuts, 132% on Brazilian nuts 
and 26% on beef. The study finally indicates that 1067 tariff lines are not covered by AGOA 
preferences. Of these, 174 lines face an average tariff rate of 2.5% and the remaining 893 lines 
face on average a tariff of 11%. These rates remain, however, below the average tariffs in SSA 
(for details, see WTO, 2001).  As mentioned several times throughout this paper, it is possible to 
test whether the expected increases in SSA’s agricultural exports to the US has occurred in the 
post-AGOA period. This test is performed using the estimation procedure described below. 
Estimation 
Once the variables have been defined, the estimation strategy is straightforward. The 
regression is run over three sub-samples of countries: (i) a full sample of the 46 countries; (ii) a 
sample of 27 countries with quarterly agricultural exports greater or equal to $100,000 on the 
average for the post-AGOA period; and (iii) a sample of the 8 major agricultural exporters, as 
indicated in Table 2
12. Due to the economic power of South Africa, we also test the sensitivity of 
these results by running the three separate regressions with South Africa excluded from the 
sample. The regressions were run in level-level, log-level and log-log, leading 18 different 
estimations. The logarithmic transformation was applied to the dependent variable and the 
variables of the Zit vector. Results are discussed in the next section. 
                                                 
12 There are nine major exporters, as indicated in Table 2, but Liberia was not included in the regression for lack of 
data. Liberia, along with Somalia, were excluded from all the regressions run in this paper.  
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5. Results and Discussion 
Results of the level-level model indicate that AGOA may have contributed to an average of 
$328,600 additional (quarterly) increase in agricultural export earnings for an average SSA 
beneficiary country. This figure increases to slightly less than $424,000 when South Africa is 
excluded from the sample of the 46 countries (Table 4). When the sample of the 27 countries 
(with average agricultural exports exceeding $100,000 in the post-AGOA period) is used, the 
marginal contribution of AGOA to expansion in the agricultural exports is even larger, about 
$0.5 million. However, the figure is very sensitive to South Africa’s inclusion in the sample, as 
the removal of South Africa reduces the estimate to nearly $0.3 million. For the top 8 agricultural 
exporters, AGOA may have contributed an increase of over $769,000 in their quarterly 
agricultural exports to the United States, again with a slight average decline when South Africa is 
excluded from the sample. Although having the appropriate sign (for example, in the sense of 
Rose (2002)) who found that GSP encourages bilateral trade), the estimates have two major 
weaknesses. First, none of the figures is statistically significant, thus casting doubts on the 
robustness of the observed positive impact of AGOA on SSA’s agricultural exports. Second, the 
specifications have a rather weak explanatory power, with R-squared ranging from about 2% (in 
the base regression with all countries) to 14.3% (in the regression of the top 8 exporters, 
excluding South Africa). The observed low explanatory power of the model stands in a sharp 
contradiction with the traditional empirical robustness of the gravity trade equation. The average 
quality of the data used in this study may, in part, be at the origin of the identified statistical 
weaknesses. Despite these weaknesses, the regressions have overall significance levels close to 
conventional ones, as indicated by the probability of rejection (Prob > F) ranging from 3.8% to 
12.8% (Table 4). 
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The log-level and log-log models offer a completely different picture. The coefficient on 
the AGOA dummy was negative for almost all sample sizes (except for Columns 5 and 6 in 
Table 5). The magnitude of the decline attributed to AGOA varied from -1.6% (Table 5, Column 
4) to -14.5% (Table 6, Column 6). This means that AGOA may have contributed to 1.6% to 
14.5% decline in SSA’s agricultural exports to US. For the top eight agricultural exporters, 
however, the results from the log-level regressions suggest an opposite effect: an increase of the 
exports by nearly 7.4% to 12.2%, if compared to the pre-AGOA export levels. Nonetheless, the 
latter two regressions can be rejected at even a 90% confidence level. At the same confidence 
level, all the regressions including South-Africa can also be rejected in Table 4. In any case, the 
AGOA dummy was not statistically different from zero, irrespective to the specification 
considered. Therefore, one may conclude that AGOA has induced neither an increase nor a 
decline in SSA agricultural exports to the US.    
The non-significance of the AGOA dummy can be attributed to many factors. First, being 
a relatively young initiative, it may take longer time before its impacts are materialized in terms 
of increased agricultural exports from SSA to US. This is the standard learning curve argument. 
Second, the implementation phase of AGOA coincided with an overall economic slowdown both 
in the US and the world, and this may have mitigated the real impact of AGOA on export 
performance in SSA. Third, the AGOA package covers commodities, such as textiles, that are 
not treated as agricultural commodities. Thus, as market access restrictions for non-agricultural 
commodities are softened under the AGOA legislation, their relative profitability may increase, 
which will trigger a reallocation of resources from agriculture towards non-agricultural export 
sectors. Under such conditions, agricultural exports will shrink, rather than expand, as a 
consequence of AGOA.  
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Besides the inconclusive AGOA result, the year dummies capture more robust results. 
These dummies are highly significant and show important increases in the average agricultural 
exports with respect to the base year, 1998. The increases are also consistent across all the six 
regression results displayed in Table 4. For example, in the first regression in Column 1 (all 46 
countries) SSA’s quarterly agricultural exports increase, on average, by more that $4.1 million in 
1999, when compared to the base year 1998. These figures reached an average of about $8.9 
million in 2000, $9.6 million in 2001 and $11.7 million for each of the first three quarters in 
2002, reflecting the over time growth in the average agricultural exports from SSA to US. A 
similar pattern can also be observed in Tables 5 and 6, even if the marginal contribution of the 
2002 dummy was sometimes less than this of the previous year. It should be emphasized that, 
larger scale studies—such as Rose (2002) and Cheng and Wall (1999)—did not find any 
significant impact of time dummies in explaining variation in bilateral trade between countries. 
These studies, therefore, concluded that globalization, defined as increased participation in the 
global trade system, was not an important factor in increasing trade over time. Our findings 
suggest that SSA’s agricultural exports to US have intensified over the past five years.  
Contrary to the basic expectation of gravity trade models, the coefficient on the US GDP 
was not positive. While the negative sign is hardly justifiable, it is possible that the GDP growth 
in US may not necessarily translate into increased demand for agricultural imports in US, as 
changes in the GDP are more likely to induce increases in the consumption of non-agricultural 
products, which tend to be more income elastic than agricultural products. Another reason that 
may explain the inconsistency is that in general, African exports are marginal in the US total 
agricultural trade. Thus, observed variations in US GDP may not have any noticeable effect on 
the demand for these exports in the US markets.  
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Also puzzling is the sign of the population coefficient for exporting African countries. 
This coefficient is negative (the first four columns), though statistically not different from zero. 
Even though the theoretical literature is ambiguous regarding the sign of the coefficient, there is 
a tendency to interpret them following Bergstrand (1989), as indicated in Cheng and Wall 
(1999). Bergstrand’s interpretation suggests that for exporting countries, a positive population 
coefficient indicates that exports are labor-intensive, whereas a negative sign suggests that they 
are capital-intensive. African agricultural exports to US are less likely to be capital-intensive. 
The sign of Ni in Table 6 seems, therefore, to be more consistent with the characteristics of SSA. 
Unfortunately, the coefficients were not statistically different from zero. 
Still using Bergstrand’s framework, the positive US population coefficients suggest that 
US imports of agricultural commodities from Africa tend to be income inelastic, as usually is the 
case with most agricultural products. This would mean that basic commodities dominate SSA’s 
agricultural exports to US, and this is consistent with the general patterns of the region’s 
agricultural exports. In fact, African exports are generally concentrated on a few primary 
commodities, and this lack of diversification is usually attributed to poor investments in 
agricultural processing, but it is also due to selective tariff barriers on processed products in 
importing countries, a practice known as tariff escalation (see Nouve et al., 2002, for a 
discussion in the case of Western Africa). The observation that US import demand for SSA’s 
agricultural products may be income inelastic reinforces the conjectured justification of the 
negative sign observed on the US GDP.  
  A final noteworthy variable in this section is the apparel visa’s dummy. Again, even if 
textiles and apparel are not the central focus in this study, they constitute a centerpiece of the 
AGOA legislative, and are likely to determine non-oil trade dynamics between SSA and the US 
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over the coming years. The apparel dummy was positive but, similar to the AGOA dummy it was 
not statistically different from zero in most regression results. Thus, participation in the apparel 
market is positively correlated with participation in the agricultural markets. Furthermore, the 
apparel provisions may constitute an important factor explaining recent investment dynamics 
originating from both within and outside SSA. Such dynamics are being observed, for example, 
in South Africa where the largest agricultural company (OTK Limited) has relocated or acquired 
new ginning facilities within the Southern African region. In particular, the company bought a 
cotton gin in Uganda in 2002. 
  Such strategic investment decisions are motivated by the special rule provisions, which 
allow sourcing textile and apparel inputs from AGOA eligible countries (see Section II for 
details). Increased investment in the cotton ginning is likely to be channeled through the supply 
chain, with subsequent supply response in agricultural production. Thus, AGOA may affect 
agricultural exports indirectly through the promotion, among others, of the textile sector within 
SSA. These dynamics would not be directly reflected in the US-SSA agricultural trade that was 
investigated in this paper
13. 
 
6. Conclusion  
The central question investigated in this paper was to determine whether the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) has led to increased agricultural exports from Sub-Saharan African 
(SSA) to the United States since the law entered into force in late 2000. The question arises 
                                                 
13We thank Michael Weber for directing our attention to these important trade and investment dynamics in Southern 
Africa. For details, see http://business.iafrica.com/news/947347.htm. In addition, Gibbon (2002) discussed how the 
performance of the clothing sector in South Africa, following EU and US preferential trade initiative, benefited 
mostly foreign-owned firms. However, irrespective of the ownership of factors, improved performance of the sector 
may be viewed as a positive impact of these preferential arrangements. Even in the case of the direct impact of 
AGOA on agricultural exports, there still will be questions regarding the distribution of the gains or losses from the 
legislation. This issue goes beyond the goal of this paper. 
 
  17 
because there is an ongoing debate about whether the legislation has achieved (or is able to 
achieve) its main goal, which is the promotion of an export-led growth through increase in SSA’s 
trading opportunities with the United States. This export-led growth is most likely to help 
transform the economic landscape of SSA, if it benefits the agricultural sector, which remains by 
far one of the most important activities in the largely agrarian African economies.  
Our investigation, which is based on panel data regression using a fixed effects gravity 
trade model, generates a rather inconclusive answer regarding the response of SSA’s agricultural 
exports to AGOA’s commercial incentives. We found that AGOA-induced increases (or decline 
in some cases) in agricultural exports are not statistically different from zero. There is no doubt 
that AGOA is a relatively young initiative and that a few more years of additional data may be 
required for a more accurate and complete evaluation of the impacts of the legislation. However, 
the preliminary assessment carried out in this paper is also necessary for shaping the making of 
the AGOA process, if the aim is to make it very responsive to the needs of agricultural exports 
development in SSA. The marginal effect of AGOA on SSA’s agricultural exports to the US 
suggests that efforts are needed in order to reinvigorate the initiative and make it responsive to 
needs for agricultural export expansion and diversification in Africa.  
Peripheral to the inconclusive result regarding the impact of AGOA on African agricultural 
trade, this study also obtains a more conclusive result regarding the trend of these exports over 
the past five years. It was found that African agricultural exports have consistently trended up 
during the last half-decade. Though secondary and indirectly related to the goal set forth in this 
paper, such an observation bears, nevertheless, some important implications for SSA’s export-led 
development strategy. This is particularly relevant in this period of Post-Uruguay Round, a 
period characterized by the global objective to dismantle tariff and non-tariff barriers to world’s 
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agricultural trade. It is usually admitted that SSA is most likely to benefit from the ongoing 
global agricultural trade reforms through diversification of both the composition and the 
destination of its exports. At a time when most African countries are increasingly concerned with 
their declining share in the global agricultural markets following the Uruguay Round 
Agreements on Agriculture, it is encouraging to notice that, on average this trend may be 
reversed (or at least not deteriorating) in the US exports market. The average positive trend does 
not, however, solve the problem of high concentration of the US trade with a handful of 
countries. It may therefore be useful to devise mechanisms that will allow a larger number of 
countries to participate in the export dynamics brought about by the new era of SSA-US trade 
relationship.  
The results obtained in this study are fairly indicative of future directions in the SSA-US 
agricultural trade, particularly the possibility for African countries to expand their exports to US. 
But, because of the average quality of the data used for the investigation, caution should be taken 
in drawing their implications. A large part of the variations in African agricultural exports to US 
remain unexplained in our model. Countries’ idiosyncrasies certainly account for some of these 
variations, and so do other factors as well. As more data become available, future assessments of 
AGOA initiative, using either the gravity trade equation or alternative bilateral trade models, will 
most likely provide a richer characterization of the impacts of the legislation on African 
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Angola  0  0 659760 719631 659760 719631  0.0  0.0 
Benin  1530 101 442 168  1973 269  59.7  30.5 
Botswana  5  28 6424 5939 6428 5967  0.1  0.6 
Burkina  F.  358  18  127 1070  485 1087  29.4  18.9 
Burundi  1658 426 282  60  1939 486  82.2  86.7 
Cameroon  2590  2778 20387 32834 22978 35613  16.3  10.0 
Cape  Verde  0  0 372 387 372 387 n.d. 0.0 
Cen  Afr.Rep 571 143 145 304 716 447  57.4  32.4 
Chad  72  57 1512 1482 1583 1540  3.3  5.4 
Comoros  453  2127 80 44  532  2171  71.1  96.6 
Congo,  DR    488  357 50765 34747 51252 35104  1.1  1.5 
Congo, Rep.   748  676  102018  90219  102765  90895  0.7  1.0 
Cote  d'Ivoire 78738 53031 15748 25899 94486 78930  77.5  53.6 
Djibouti  50  19  39 313  88 332 n.d.  4.6 
Eq  Guinea  1  3  21748 120823  21749 120826  0.0  0.0 
Eritrea  43 10 75 50  118 60  26.2  19.4 
Ethiopia  8164 6157 1098  932 9262 7089  89.0  86.9 
Gabon  119  135 389976 421679 390095 421813  0.0  0.0 
Gambia  1 35  261 60  262 96  1.2  19.1 
Ghana  11628 11120 35007 28411 46635 39530  24.0  28.1 
Guinea  431  630 26182 20349 26613 20979  1.5  4.4 
G-Bissau  0 0  193 6  194 6  n.d.  n.d. 
Kenya  9818  9801 16438 28694 26255 38495  37.5  26.4 
Lesotho  0  0 29268 66871 29268 66871  0.0  0.0 
Liberia  8151  10782 331 472  8481  11253  96.0  95.9 
Madagascar  9039 27316 16740 38758 25779 66074  39.3  37.4 
Malawi  13013 13960  777  3092 13791 17051  93.7  79.8 
Mali  302  91 1419 1018 1721 1110  18.6  8.6 
Mauritania  0  0  125 83  125 83  3.3  0.0 
Mauritius  2285  2404 65324 67633 67610 70038  3.2  3.4 
Mozambique  4637  1017 398 250  5035  1267  89.3  62.1 
Namibia  165  13  10156 9155  10321 9168  1.8  0.2 
Niger  32  1  1097 304  1128 304  7.8  1.0 
Nigeria  2023  2670 1535982 1851079 1538006 1853749  0.2  0.2 
Rwanda  519 667 546 654  1065  1321  42.6  41.7 
S.  Tom.&  P.  2  0 322 102 324 102  7.1  0.0 
Sénégal  95  939  2145 14129  2241 15068  8.7  18.6 
Seychelles  6  0 1284 6258 1290 6258  1.2  0.0 
Sierra  Leone  52  80  2149 903  2201 983  4.3  8.9 
Somalia  37 16 74 78  112 94  22.7  28.2 
South  Africa  28674  29131  842138 1042050  870812 1071181  3.3  2.7 
Sudan  23  68 390 508 413 575 n.d.  10.0 
Swaziland  1996 1050 7621  19726 9617  20776  14.8  5.5 
Tanzania  1996 1786 6450 4772 8446 6559  23.4  27.4 
Togo  373 244 551  1850 924  2094  50.6  20.7 
Uganda  3786 2845 1586 1224 5373 4069  73.3 66.3 
Zambia  308  204 8255 2972 8563 3176  4.8  8.3 



















Source: US International Trade Commission (USITC) 
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Table 2: Major Exporters of Agricultural Products from SSA to the United States 
Countries/Items 1998-2000 2001  2002*
Total SSA’s exports ($ million)   752.6 757.6  569.9
                                                                                            Share of (%) 
Cote d'Ivoire  40.4 30.0  25.3
South Africa  14.1 14.0  17.2
Malawi 6.2 7.8  6.7
Ghana 6.1 7.7  3.5
Kenya 4.8 5.1  5.2
Madagascar 4.2 11.1  18.8
Ethiopia 4.1 3.4  3.1
Liberia 3.9 5.4  6.0
Zimbabwe 2.9 3.1  4.1
Total share of the nine countries above  86.7 87.5  90.0
*Data in 2002 is for the first three quarters 
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Table 3: Major Exporters of Non-agricultural Products from SSA to the United States 
Countries/Items 1998-2000 2001  2002*
Total SSA’s exports ($ million)   13731 20303  12493
                                                                                           Share of (%) 
Nigeria 38.5     43.9  32.4
South Africa  22.0 21.3  23.8
Angola 17.0 13.7  18.1
Gabon 10.1 8.5  9.8
Total share of the four countries above  87.7 87.4  84.1
*Data in 2002 is for the first three quarters 
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Table 4: Regression Results (p-values in parentheses) 
Full Sample 
(46 countries) 
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 Table 5: Regression Results (p-values in parentheses) 
Full Sample 
(46 countries) 




Top 8 Agricultural 
Exporters 
Dependent Variable:  
 
Log (AGXit ) (Log of 
quarterly Agricultural 
Exports from SSA 



























































































































































































































First Quarter (Q1) 
(Dummy for the 1
st quarter 










































































*P-values are in parentheses 
  28 
  29
Table 6: Regression Results (p-values in parentheses) 
Full Sample 
(46 countries) 
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